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Abstract This work discusses the presuppositional meanings of three kinds of per-
spectival (perspective-sensitive) verbs: (i) motion-deictic verbs, (ii) empathy-loaded
verbs, and (iii) referent-honorific verbs, and their implications on the taxonomy of
“projective content”, which subsumes but is not limited to presupposition. Build-
ing on Tonhauser, Beaver, Roberts & Simons’s (2013) four-way classification of
projective content, I propose a more fine-grained, six-way classification that dis-
tinguishes “global-context oriented” content, which obligatorily projects through
a “filter” operator such as a belief predicate, and “ambioriented” content, which
optionally does so. I also develop a “pseudo-multidimensional” representation of
natural language meaning, where (i) proffered content, (ii) nonpresuppositional
projective content, and (iii) presuppositional projective content have distinct roles
in the sentence meaning, while anaphoric interaction across them is nevertheless
possible.
Keywords: projective content, conventional implicature, presupposition, deixis, empathy,
honorifics
1 Introduction
This work discusses the presuppositional meanings of three kinds of perspectival
(perspective-sensitive) verbs: (i) motion-deictic verbs (e.g., English go/come), (ii)
empathy-loaded verbs (e.g., Japanese yaru/kureru ‘give’), and (iii) referent-honorific
verbs (e.g., Japanese osumaida ‘reside’), and their implications on the taxonomy of
“projective content”. Building on Tonhauser et al.’s (2013) four-way classification
of projective content, I propose a more fine-grained, six-way classification that
distinguishes “global-context oriented” content, which obligatorily projects through
a “filter” operator such as a belief predicate, and “ambioriented” content, which
optionally does so. I also develop a “pseudo-multidimensional” representation of
natural language meaning, where three semantic components – (i) proffered content,
(ii) nonpresuppositional projective content, and (iii) presuppositional projective
content – have distinct roles in the sentence meaning, while anaphoric interaction
across them is nevertheless possible.
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proffered content
(= at-issue content)
conventional meaning
projective content
(= conventional implicature (CI))
presupposional CI
(= presupposition)
(≈ Karttunen & Peters’s (1979) CI)
nonpresupposional CI
(≈ Potts’s (2005) CI)
Figure 1 Three types of conventionally coded meaning
2 Terminological clarification
It has long been acknowledged that the (conventionally coded) meaning of a natural
language sentence can be divided into multiple components (layers, dimensions),
one of which is “main”, “central”, and “foregrounded”. Various labels have been
applied to the foregrounded and backgrounded components, and some labels, in
particular conventional implicature and presupposition, have been used by different
ways by different authors. A note on the terminology adopted in this work is thus
needed.
After Tonhauser et al. (2013), I use projective content as a cover term for all
kinds of the backgrounded meaning, which project through a “hole” operator such
as negation, question, and a modal. I refer to the foregrounded meaning, on the other
hand, as proffered content or at-issue content.
As will be detailed shortly, projective content can be either presuppositional
or nonpresuppositional. The former type, which can be (and most often has been)
simply called presupposition, roughly corresponds to what Karttunen & Peters
(1979) call conventional implicature (CI); the latter roughly corresponds to what
Potts (2005) calls CI. I use the term CI in a broad sense, and as an alternative label
for projective content. See Figure 1 for a summary.
3 Tonhauser et al.’s (2013) taxonomy
Tonhauser et al. (2013) propose to classify projective content based on two criteria:
(i) whether they are subject to the strong contextual felicity (SCF) constraint, i.e.,
whether they must have been part of the interlocutors’ common ground prior to the
utterance, and (ii) whether they have the obligatory local effect (OLE), i.e., whether
their projection is necessarily “filtered” by a belief predicate (Table 1).
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classes SCF OLE examples
A + + additive implication of too
B − − appositive, NRRC, expressive
C − + prejacent implication of only
D + − “indication” implication of a demonstrative
Table 1 Tonhauser et al.’s (2013) taxonomy
Projective contents that meet both criteria (i.e., Class A) correspond to paradig-
matic presuppositions, and include the additive implication induced by the focus
particle too. Due to the SCF constraint, (1) will be felicitous as a reply to (2b) but
not as a reply to (2a). Due to the OLE, utterance (3) does not commit the speaker to
the truth of ‘Somebody other than Ken sang’, but rather to the truth of ‘Lucy believes
that somebody other than Ken sang’.
(1) [Ken]F sang, too.  ‘Somebody other than Ken sang.’
(2) a. I have no idea who sang. Who, if anybody, sang?
b. I heard that John sang. Who else, if anybody, sang?
(3) Lucy believes that [Ken]F sang, too.
6 ‘Somebody other than Ken sang.’
 ‘Lucy believes that somebody other than Ken sang.’
A major advantage of this two-dimensional classification is that it provides
natural home for so-called “weak” or “informational” presupposition (e.g., Prince
1978; Birner 2013; cf. Abusch 2002). The prejacent implication of only, for example,
is projective but is filtered by a belief predicate, as shown in (5). At the same time, it
does not need to be taken for granted in the discourse situation, as evidenced by the
observation that (4) can be a felicitous reply to (2a) (see Beaver & Clark 2008 for
discussion). Under Tonhauser et al.’s taxonomy, it can be understood to be a “Class
C” projective content.
(4) Only [Ken]F sang.  ‘Ken sang.’
(5) Lucy believes that only [Ken]F sang.
6 ‘Ken sang.’
 ‘Lucy believes that Ken sang.’
It is worth noting here that it may be simplistic to treat the OLE and SCF as
categorical features. It has been pointed out in the literature (and acknowledged by
Tonhauser et al. 2013: 101–102), for example, that the projective content induced by
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an additive focus particle may “leak” upward under certain configurations. Heim
(1992) gives example (6) to illustrate that, when an additive particle is embedded
under an attitude predicate, the additive implication could be understood to be part
of the external speaker’s commitments, rather than of the attitude holder’s.
(6) (Two kids are talking to each other on the phone.)
John: I am already in bed.
Mary: My parents think [I]F am also in bed.
In a similar vein, it appears that sentence (3) is not to be deemed completely
unacceptable in the discourse situation illustrated in (7).
(7) (A and B agree that Lucy has no idea about whether people other than Ken
sang or not.)
A: So, who sang?
B: Let’s see. John sang for sure. And Lucy believes that [Ken]F sang, too.
It seems impossible, on the other hand, to interpret the prejacent implication of
only occurring in the complement clause of a belief predicate as a commitment of
the external speaker; i.e., there cannot be upward leaking in this case.
It is also interesting to consider, in this connection, the case of the implicational
verb manage (Oshima 2006a: 180–182); when this trigger is embedded under a belief
predicate, the “difficulty” implication can easily be understood to be a commitment
of the attitude holder; however, the alternative interpretation elicited in (9), where
this implication is part of the speaker’s commitments, appears not to be ruled out.
(8) Lucy believes that Ken will manage to beat Bill.
 ‘Lucy believes that it will be difficult for Ken to beat Bill.’
OR: ‘It will be difficult for Ken to beat Bill.’
(9) Although Ken has been doing quite well in this year’s contest, I don’t think
he has much chance of winning against John, the last year’s champion, in the
game tomorrow. Lucy, however, is convinced that Ken is the absolute best.
She thus naturally believes that Ken will manage to beat Bill.
Furthermore, with manage, it seems that projection to the global level is easier
than in the case of too/also. These observations suggest that the OLE is a matter of
continuum – some projective contents are completely obligatorily local, others are
more or less obligatorily local, and so on.
A similar point applies to the SCF feature. While distinguishing Class C content
from classical presupposition (= Class A content) is a major advance over the
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simple dichotomy between regular entailment and presupposition, in practice it is
not a straightforward matter to decide whether a given projective meaning (i) is
presuppositional but can be (globally or locally) accommodated, or (ii) is not subject
to the SCF constraint in the first place. A case in point is the factive implication of
know. While Tonhauser et al. treat it as a Class C content, one could alternatively
consider that it is a Class A content that is, for some reason, easier to accommodate
than the additive implication of too. It seems sensible to suspect that the SCF feature,
too, is of a continuous nature; some projective contents are strongly presuppositional
(and are impossible or hard to accommodate), others are mildly so (and can be easily
accommodated) and yet others are not presuppositional at all.
Having said these, in what follows I accept the premise that the [±OLE] and
[±SCF] features are valid ways to classify projective contents. They may be sim-
plistic to a certain extent, but nevertheless are useful descriptive notions.
The meanings of appositives, nonrestrictive relative clauses (NRRC’s), and
expressives are [−OLE] and [−SCF], and thus fall under Class B. To illustrate the
[−SCF] status of an NRRC, (10) can be a felicitous utterance despite the content of
the NRRC not being part of the interlocutors’ common ground.
(10) (S(peaker) assumes that H(earer) does not know anything about the author
Yasunari Kawabata.)
I have translated several works by Yasunari Kawabata, who was awarded a
Nobel Prize in literature in 1968.
 ‘Kawabata was awarded a Nobel Prize in literature in 1968.’
Example (11) illustrates the [−OLE] status of an NRRC. (11a) naturally allows
a reading which commits the speaker to the truth of Ken’s being a car sales represen-
tative. (11b), on the other hand, naturally allows a reading where Ken’s being a spy
is to be taken as part of Lucy’s beliefs (Amaral, Roberts & Smith 2007; cf. Harris &
Potts 2009).
(11) Lucy is mentally disturbed. She believes that Ken, who is {a. an ordinary
car sales representative / b. a trained spy}, is tapping her phone.
a.  ‘Ken is an ordinary car sales representative.’
(OR, less plausibly:  ‘Lucy believes that Ken is an ordinary car sales
representative.’)
b.  ‘Lucy believes that Ken is a trained spy.’
(OR, less plausibly:  ‘Ken is a trained spy.’)
Tonhauser et al.’s (2013) Class D includes the implication induced by a focus that
there are contextually salient alternative propositions, and the implication induced
by a demonstrative that the speaker is indicating (e.g., demonstrating) some entity.
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(12) [Wilma]F called Fred.
 ‘There is at least one contextually salient proposition of the form “X called
Fred” and is distinct from “Wilma called Fred”.’
(13) Ken likes that car.
 ‘S is indicating something.’
(14) illustrates the [−OLE] status of the “indication” implication of a demon-
strative.
(14) Lucy believes that Ken likes that car.
 ‘S is indicating something.’
6 ‘Lucy believes that S (or some other individual) is indicating something.’
The Class D contents taken up by Tonhauser et al. (2013) seem to be of a rather
different nature from the other kinds of projective contents that they discuss, in being
concerned with the proper usage of linguistic expressions than with the description
of the state of affairs, or, in being metalinguistic rather than descriptive. One may
that find it more sensible to treat them as part of the linguistic convention, rather
than of conventionally coded meaning (I will not attempt to argue for either position
here).
4 A more elaborate taxonomy
One limitation of Tonhauser et al.’s (2013) taxonomy is that it does not consider
the “obligatory global effect”. [−OLE] contents can be further classified into two
subtypes: those that are obligatorily global, and those that are optionally global.
I propose to classify projective content/conventional implicature (recall that these
two notions are equated in the current work) into six classes, based on the criteria
summarized in (15) and Table 2:
(15) i. Context-Checking (presuppositional, uninformative; ≈ [+SCF])
vs. Context-Updating (nonpresuppositional, potentially informative;
≈ [−SCF])
ii. Local-Context Oriented (LCO; ≈ [+OLE]) vs. Ambioriented vs. Global-
Context Oriented (GCO)
Tonhauser et al.’s Classes A and C quite straightforwardly correspond to my
Classes (i) and (ii). The Class D contents discussed by Tonhauser et al. (2013) (e.g.,
the “indication” implication of a demonstrative) always need to be satisfied in the
global context of evaluation, and fall under my Class (v).
As discussed earlier, when an NRRC, which is a Class B trigger according to
Tonhauser et al.’s (2013), is embedded under a belief predicate, its content can be
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LCO Ambioriented GCO
Context-Checking (i) (iii) (v)
Context-Updating (ii) (iv) (vi)
Table 2 The proposed taxonomy of projective content/conventional implicature
interpreted either as a commitment of the external speaker, or of the secondary agent
(the holder of the belief). The same happens to appositives and expressives (Amaral
et al. 2007), as well. This makes them [Ambioriented] and [Context-Updating], i.e.,
Class (iv) contents.
The distinction between [Global-Context Oriented] and [Ambioriented] is useful
even if all we need to consider is the kinds of projective content triggers taken up by
Tonhauser et al.; their four-way distinction is too coarse to capture the fact that, for
example, the meaning of an NRRC (Class B) and the “indication” implication of a
demonstrative (Class D) differ not only in terms of presuppositoinality ([±SCF]),
but also in that only the latter is obligatorily anchored to the global context (i.e.,
is [GCO]). Also, one may treat the “difficulty” implication of manage as a Class
D content, but it contrasts quite clearly from the Class D contents taken up by
Tonhauser et al., again, in terms of whether they can be anchored to the local context
or not (i.e., is [Ambioriented] or not).
In the following, I will illustrate that the meanings of perspectival verbs provide
further motivation for the more fine-grained taxonomy proposed above. The per-
spectival meanings of deictic motion verbs (in English) and empathy-loaded verbs
(in Japanese) will be shown to be Class (iii) contents. Those of referent-honorific
verbs (in Japanese) will be shown to be Class (v).
5 Formulation of the [Context-Checking]/[Context-Updating] features
As a preliminary to the discussion of perspectival verbs, I illustrate in this section
the format of semantic representation that I will utilize.
The proffered content and (nonpresuppositional and presuppositional) projec-
tive content play different roles in sentence meaning, and thus can be regarded to
constitute distinct components/layers/dimensions of linguistically coded meaning.
Nevertheless, semantic interactions, such as anaphoric relations, across these com-
ponents are possible (Karttunen & Peters 1979; Amaral et al. 2007; AnderBois,
Brasoveanu & Henderson 2013).
Multidimensional approaches to semantic representation, such as the ones de-
veloped by Karttunen & Peters (1979) and Potts (2005), account for the first fact,
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but have trouble dealing with the second. I adopt what can be called a pseudo-
multidimensional system of semantic representation, where (i) proffered content,
(ii) nonpresuppositional CI, and (iii) presuppositional CI are represented within a
single logical expression, but nevertheless contribute to the pragmatic import of
the utterance in distinct ways. This system is an extension of Oshima’s (2006a,b)
“truth-combination” system.
The basic ideas are as follows. I introduce a ternary operator called transjunction,
and distinguish two levels of truth values. The first is the classic values of type
t, 1 and 0, for logical formulas of the familiar kind; they will be referred to as
semantic truth values. The second is the pragmatic truth values, namely I, II, and III,
which are respectively concerned with “truth of proffered content”, “satisfaction of
nonpresuppositional CI” and “satisfaction of presupposition(al CI)”. The extension
of a root declarative clause will be understood to be a set of pragmatic truth values,
rather than an individual (semantic or pragmatic) value. A new semantic type, T ,
for a set of pragmatic truth values, is introduced. The syntax and semantics of
transjunction are defined as follows:
(16) The syntax and semantics of transjunction
syntax:
If φ , ψ , and χ are expressions of type t (Dt = {1, 0}), then 〈φ ; ψ; χ〉 is an
expression of type T (DT =℘({I, II, III})).
semantics:
i. I ∈ J〈φ ; ψ; χ〉Kg iff JφKg = 1,
ii. II ∈ J〈φ ; ψ; χ〉Kg iff JψKg = 1, and
iii. III ∈ J〈φ ; ψ; χ〉Kg iff JχKg = 1.
A root declarative clause generally denotes a function from Kaplanian contexts
to functions from worlds to sets of pragmatic truth values. Sentence (17a), which I
take to involve no nontrivial CI, will translate into (17b); T is a logical constant that
is mapped to semantic truth value 1 under any assignment.
(17) a. I admire Hemingway.
b. λc[λw[〈admire(w, Ag(c), hemingway); T; T〉]]
Sentence (18a), which involves the nonpresuppositional CI: ‘Kawabata is a
Japanese novelist’ and the presuppositional CI: ‘I admire someone other than Kawa-
bata’, will translate into (18b).
(18) a. I also admire [Kawabata]F, a Japanese novelist.
b. λc[λw[〈admire(w, Ag(c), kawabata); japanese-novelist(w, kawabata);
∃x[x 6= kawabata ∧ admire(w, Ag(c), x)]〉]]
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The context change potential – or pragmatic contribution – of a root declarative
clause will be as in (19); Cx (or Context with capital C) is the context in the dynamic-
semantic sense, which I take here to be a set of triples of Kaplanian contexts (c),
worlds (w), and assignments (g).
(19) The context change potential of a root declarative clause
Let α be a root declarative clause whose logical form is Φ
(= λc[λw[〈φ ; ψ; χ〉]]). Then, Cx + α is defined only if:
i. for all 〈c, w, g〉 ∈ Cx, III ∈ JΦKg(c)(w),
ii. there is at least one 〈c, w, g〉 ∈ Cx such that II ∈ JΦKg(c)(w), and
iii. there is at least one 〈c, w, g〉 ∈ Cx such that I /∈ JΦKg(c)(w).
If defined, Cx + α = Cx’ such that Cx’ ⊆ Cx and for all 〈c, w, g〉 ∈ Cx’,
{I, II} ⊆ JΦKg(c)(w)
Clause (i) in (19) dictates that the presupposition (i.e., the [Context-Checking]
CI) must have been part of the common ground prior to the utterance. Clause (ii)
dictates that the [Context-Updating] CI must not impose false information. Clause
(iii), finally, dictates that the proffered content must be informative. Whether the
third clause should be part of the definition of a context change potential will be
debatable, as in actual conversations it is not uncommon for a speaker to make a
statement whose proffered content is assumed to be known to the hearer (e.g., “Come
on, you are not a five-year-old kid.”). On the other hand, intuitively, (20a) is likely
to sound redundant and odd in situation (21a) but not (21b), and (20b) is likely to
sound redundant and odd in situation (21b) but not (21a); both (20a,b) are fine in
situation (21c). Clause (iii) will be useful to account for this pattern.
(20) a. I admire Obama, (who is) the 44th President of the U.S.
b. Obama, who I admire, is the 44th President of the U.S.
(21) a. It is common ground that S admires Obama, and it is not common ground
that Obama is the 44th U.S. president.
b. It is common ground that Obama is the 44th U.S. president, and it is not
common ground that S admires Obama.
c. It it not common ground S admires Obama, or that Obama is the 44th U.S.
president.
Anyhow, according to (19), utterance (18a) will be felicitous only if (i) the
Context gurantees that S admires Kawabata, and (ii) the Context is compatible
with the information that Kawabata is a Japanese novelist, and (iii) the Context is
compatible with the information that S does not admire Kawabata.
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6 Motion-deictic verbs and empathy-loaded verbs as Class (iii) CI triggers
In Oshima (2006a,b), it was argued that the “not-at-issue” meanings of motion-
deictic verbs (e.g., English go/come) and empathy-loaded verbs (e.g, Japanese yaru/
kureru ‘give’) make reference to a contextual component – the RP, a set of entities
serving as potential reference points, for the former, and the ER, a poset of entities
based on the empathy relation (“a receives a higher degree of empathy than b”) for
the latter. Furthermore, these components can either be part of the global or local
context, which implies that these perspectival verbs are “all-purpose indexicals” in
Schlenker’s (2003) sense.
6.1 Motion-deictic verbs
Roughly, go conveys (as a CI) that no member of the RP is located at the destination
of the motion at the utterance time, and come conveys (as a CI) that at least one
member of the RP is located at the destination either at the utterance time or at the
event time. With data like the following, it can be shown that the CI induced by a
deictic motion verb is presuppositional, i.e., [Context-Checking] (cf. Barlew 2014).
(22) In the 1990s I would tour all around North America as a stand-up comedian.
One day, #(when I was staying in Austin,) my brother, who was then a grad-
uate student, came to University of Texas to attend an academic conference.
To illustrate the ambiorientedness of the CI induced by a deictic motion verb,
(23) may convey either (24a) or (24b) as a CI, so that it can be felicitous either in
situation (25a) or (25b).
(23) Lucy believes that Ken came to Chicago.
(24) a. Some member of the RP (in the global context) – which is most likely
{S, H} – is or was located in Chicago.
b. Lucy believes that some member of the RP (in the local context) – which
is most likely {Lucy} – is or was located in Chicago.
(25) a. S and H agree (i) that they are and were in Chicago, and (ii) that Lucy
believes that she is and was in Austin.
b. S and H agree (i) that they are and were in Austin, and (ii) that Lucy
believes that she is and was in Chicago.
The logical forms corresponding to the two readings of (23) will be along the
lines of (26a,b):
(26) a. λc[λw[〈∀〈c′, w′〉 ∈ Dox(w, lucie)[move-to(w′, ken, chicago)]; T;
∃x[x ∈ RP(c) ∧ at(w, x, chicago)]〉]]
52
The meanings of perspectival verbs
b. λc[λw[〈∀〈c′, w′〉 ∈ Dox(w, lucie)[move-to(w′, ken, chicago)]; T;
∀〈c′, w′〉 ∈ Dox(w, lucie)[∃x[x ∈ RP(c′) ∧ at(w′, x, chicago)]]〉]]
6.2 Empathy-loaded verbs
Linguistic empathy, as Kuno (1987: 206) defines it, is an agent’s “identification,
which may vary in degree, with a person or thing”; it is reflected in language in a
number of ways, and is sometimes encoded lexically or grammatically.
Paradigmatic examples of empathy-loaded expressions are the Japanese giving
verbs yaru (and its stylistic variant ageru) and kureru, both of which map the donor
participant to the subject, and thus translate into English give. Yaru conveys that the
relevant agent (most typically the speaker) empathizes with the donor at least to the
same extent as with the recipient, while kureru conveys that she empathizes with
the recipient to a greater extent than with the donor. Put differently, yaru implicates
that the donor does not outrank the recipient on the contextually relevant ER (i.e.,
the poset based on the degree of empathy), and kureru implicates that the donor is
outranked by the recipient on the ER.1
(27) Ken-ga
K.-Nom
Mari-ni
M.-Dat
sono
that
hon-o
book-Acc
{a. yatta/b. kureta}.
yaru.Pst/kureru.Pst
‘Ken gave Mari that book.’
a.  ‘Ken does not outrank Mari on the ER.’
b.  ‘Ken is outranked by Mari on the ER.’
In a root environment, the relevant agent is the speaker, and accordingly the
speaker is invariably the greatest element of the ER. In consequence, yaru must be
chosen when the speaker is the donor, and kureru will be the only possible choice
when the speaker is the recipient.
(28) a. Boku-ga
I-Nom
Ken-ni
K.-Dat
sono
that
hon-o
book-Acc
{yatta/#kureta}.
yaru.Pst/kureru.Pst
‘I gave Ken that book.’
b. Ken-ga
K.-Nom
boku-ni
I-Dat
sono
that
hon-o
book-Acc
{#yatta/kureta}.
yaru.Pst/kureru.Pst
‘Ken gave me that book.’
1 The abbreviations in the glosses are: Acc = accusative, Attr = attributive, Comp = complementizer,
Cond = conditional, Cop = copula, Dat = dative, DAux = discourse auxiliary, DP = discourse
particle, Evid = evidential auxiliary, Gen = genitive, Ger = gerund, Hon = honorific, Inf = infinitive,
Loc = locative, Neg(Aux) = negation (auxiliary), Nom = nominative, Npfv = nonperfective auxiliary,
NSHon = non-subject honorific, Plt = polite, Pot = potential, Prs = present, Pst = past, SHon =
subject honorific, Th = thematic wa (topic/ground marker).
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Yaru and kureru can also be used as benefactive auxiliary verbs, in which case
they respectively indicate that the beneficiary does not outrank and outranks the
benefactor on the ER.
(29) Ken-ga
K.-Nom
Mari-o
M.-Acc
oshite
push.Ger
{a. yatta/b. kureta}.
yaru.Pst/kureru.Pst
‘Ken pushed Mari for her sake.’
 ‘Ken’s pushing Mari was beneficial for Mari.’ (benefactive CI)
a.  ‘Ken does not outrank Mari on the ER.’ (empathic CI)
b.  ‘Ken is outranked by Mari on the ER.’ (empathic CI)
The benefactive and empathic meanings of yaru and kureru as auxiliaries are both
projective; the former is arguably a Class (i) content, and will be put aside in what
follows. With data like (30), it can be shown that the empathic CI induced by an
empathy-loaded verb is presuppositional (note that the speaker’s close relatives are
expected to recieve a high degree of empathy).
(30) (S and H are acquainted but not close.)
a. Sengetsu,
last.month
saifu-o
wallet-Acc
nakushite
lose.Ger
komatte
be.troubled.Ger
iru
Npfv.Prs
ryokoosha-o
traveler-Acc
tasukete
help.Ger
{yarimashita/#kuremashita}-yone?
yaru.Pst.Plt/kureru.Pst.Plt-DP
(Jitsuwa,
actually
are-wa
that-Th
watashi-no
I-Gen
otooto
little.brother
na
Cop.Attr
ndesu.)
DAux.Prs.Plt
‘You helped out last month a traveler who lost his wallet and was in
trouble, didn’t you? (Actually, that is my little brother.)’
b. Sengetsu,
last.month
saifu-o
wallet-Acc
nakushite
lose.Ger
komatte
be.troubled.Ger
iru
Npfv.Prs
otooto-o
little.brother-Acc
tasukete
help.Ger
{??yarimashita/kuremashita}-yone?
yaru.Pst.Plt/kureru.Pst.Plt-DP
‘You helped out last month my little brother, who lost his wallet and was
in trouble, didn’t you? ’
Linguistic manifestation of the empathy relation is a broad phenomenon. As
discussed in Oshima (2007a), the direct/inverse opposition (or “syntactic direction”)
of transitive verbs in such languages as Cree, Navajo, and Jinghpaw, can be taken to
be a grammatical means to express the empathy relation between the participants
in a more systematic way than the Japanese yaru/kureru opposition does. Empathy
is also concerned with the obviation marking on third-person nominals in Cree
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(Oshima 2007a), as well as the licensing of certain kinds of long-distance anaphors
(e.g. Japanese jibun, English self-pronouns; Oshima 2007b).
It has been pointed out in the literature that in an (indirect) reported discourse
environment, an empathy-loaded verb can be interpreted either with respect to the
external speaker’s (the primary agent’s) or with respect to the attitude holder’s (the
secondary agent’s) perspective (Oshima 2006a and references therein).2
(31) a. Boku-ga
I-Nom
Ken-o
K.-Acc
tetsudatte
help.Ger
{yaru/#kureru}.
yaru.Prs/kureru.Prs
‘I will give Ken a hand.’
b. Ken-wa
K.-Th
[boku-ga
I-Nom
tetsudatte
help.Ger
yaru]
yaru.Prs
to
Comp
omotte
believe.Ger
iru.
Npfv.Prs
‘Ken believes that I will give him a hand.’ (primary perspective)
c. Ken-wa
K.-Th
[boku-ga
I-Nom
tetsudatte
help.Ger
kureru]
kureru.Prs
to
Comp
omotte
believe.Ger
iru.
Npfv.Prs
‘idem’ (secondary perspective)
(32) a. Ken-no
K.-Gen
otooto-ga
little.brother-Nom
boku-o
I-Acc
tetsudatte
help.Ger
{#yatta/kureta}.
yaru.Pst/kureru.Pst
‘Ken’s brother gave me a hand.’
b. Keni-wa
K.-Th
[karei-no
he-Gen
otooto-ga
little.brother-Nom
boku-o
I-Acc
tetsudatte
help.Ger
kureta]
kureru.Pst
to
Comp
omotte
believe.Ger
iru.
Npfv.Prs
‘Keni believes that hisi brother gave me a hand.’ (primary perspective)
c. Keni-wa
K.-Th
[jibuni-no
self-Gen
otooto-ga
little.brother-Nom
boku-o
I-Acc
tetsudatte
help.Ger
yatta]
yaru.Pst
to
Comp
omotte
believe.Ger
iru.
Npfv.Prs
‘idem’ (secondary perspective)
This implies that the empathic meanings induced by yaru/kureru are
ambioriented. Sentence (33) allows two interpretations illustrated in (34)
(“outrank(a, b, P)” is read as “a outranks b on the poset P”); (34a) will be more
plausible if Mari and Yumi are respectively Ken’s and the speaker’s sister, and (34b)
will be more plausible in the converse situation.
2 In (32), the choice of the anaphoric expression kare facilitates the choice of kureru, and the choice
of jibun facilitates the choice of kureru. This has to do with the perspective-sensitivity of jibun; see
Oshima (2006a) for discussion.
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(33) Ken-wa
K.-Th
[Mari-ga
M.-Nom
Yumi-o
Y.-Acc
tetsudatte
help.Ger
kureta]
yaru.Prs
to
Comp
omotte
believe.Ger
iru.
Npfv.Prs
‘Ken believes that Mari gave Yumi a hand.’
(34) a. λc[λw[〈∀〈c′, w′〉 ∈ Dox(w, ken)[give-a-hand(w′, mari, yumi)]; T;
outrank(yumi, mari, ER(c))〉]]
b. λc[λw[〈∀〈c′, w′〉 ∈ Dox(w, ken)[give-a-hand(w′, mari, yumi)]; T;
∀〈c′, w′〉 ∈ Dox(w, ken)[outrank(yumi, mari, ER(c′))]〉]]
7 Honorifics as Class (iv) CI triggers
Japanese referent-honorific predicates, which are regarded as CI triggers by Potts &
Kawahara (2004) and McCready (2010), can be classified into (i) subject honorifics,
which express respect toward the referent of the subject (the least oblique argument),
and (ii) non-subject honorifics, which express respect toward the referent of the
second least oblique argument.
(35) a. Yamada-kyooju-wa
Y.-professor-Th
Osaka-ni
O.-Dat
osumaida.
live.SHon.Prs
‘Prof. Yamada (who I honor) lives in Osaka.’
b. Ken-ga
K.-Nom
Yamada-kyooju-o
Y.-professor-Acc
otetsudaishita.
help.NSHon.Pst
‘Ken assisted Prof. Yamada (who I honor).’
For the appropriate use of a referent-honorific, it must be taken for granted or at
least be easily inferrable that the relevant referent is honored by the speaker.
(36) (A and B work at the same hotel. A mentions a man who made a scene at
a café across the street. B has seen him, and realized that the man was a
professor of his college days.)
A: Kimi-wa
you-Th
sawagi-o
disturbance-Acc
okoshita
cause.Pst
otoko-o
man-Acc
mita-no?
see.Pst-DAux.Prs
‘Did you see the man who made the scene?’
B: Ee,
yes,
okane-o
money-Acc
{motte
have.Ger
nai
Npfv.Neg.Prs
/ #omochide
have.SHon.Inf
nai}
NegAux.Prs
noni
although
shokuji-o
meal-Acc
{shita
do.Pst
/ #sareta}
do.SHon.Pst
yoodesu.
Evid.Prs.Plt
‘Yes, from what I heard, he had a meal although he did not have money.’
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The use of honorifics in (36B) would be acceptable if B first informed A of the
relation between him and the man in question. It can be concluded, thus, that an
honorific CI is presuppositional (i.e., [Context-Checking]).
Japanese referent-honorific predicates, although deictic in a broad sense (i.e.,
social-deictic), exhibit an interesting contrast with the two classes of perspectival
verbs discussed in Section 6. That is, their honorific (social-deictic) meanings
always, rather than optionally, project through a belief predicate. (37) illustrates this
point.
(37) (Sota Kubo is the president of a company, and his son Akio Kubo is an
executive director. Toru Noda is a young employee working under Akio.)
a. (an utterance by Toru Noda)
Shacho-wa
president-Th
[goshisoku
son.Hon
no
Cop.Attr
Akio-sama-ga
A.-Suffix-Nom
Osaka-ni
O.-Dat
{??sunde
live.Ger
iru
Npfv.Prs
/ osumaida}]
live.SHon.Prs
to
Comp
omotte
believe.Ger
irassharu.
Npfv.SHon.Prs
‘The president (who I honor) believes that his son Akio (who I honor)
lives in Osaka.’
b. (an utterance by Sota Kubo)
Noda
N.
Toru-kun-wa
T.-Suffix-Th
[ore-no
I-Gen
segare-ga
son-Nom
Kobe-ni
K.-Dat
{sunde
live.Ger
iru
Npfv.Prs
/
#osumaida}]
live.SHon.Prs
to
Comp
omotte
believe.Ger
iru.
Npfv.Prs
‘Toru Noda believes that my son lives in Osaka.’
(37b) with osumaida is deemed to be odd because this embedded honorific
predicate can only be interpreted as expressing Sota’s respect toward his son Akio,
and this contradicts the social norms (according to which a father does not “honor”
his son as long as the usage of referent honorifics is concerned). That is, (37b) with
osumaida can have the meaning illustrated in (38a), but not the one illustrated in
(38b).
(38) a. λc[λw[〈∀〈c′, w′〉 ∈ Dox(w, toru)[live(w′, akio, kobe)]; T;
honor(Ag(c), akio)〉]]
b. λc[λw[〈∀〈c′, w′〉 ∈ Dox(w, toru)[live(w′, akio, kobe)]; T;
∀〈c′, w′〉 ∈ Dox(w, toru)[honor(Ag(c′), akio)〉]]]
It is also worth mentioning that when a honorific verb occurs in the consequent
of a conditional, its presuppositional meaning can only be understood to target
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the global (original) common ground, rather than the common ground temporarily
augmented by the content of the antecedent.3
(39) (The interlocutors are eating at a local ramen restaurant. S is H’s senior
colleague.)
Kimi-ga
you-Nom
koozoku
imperial.family
dattara,
Cop.Cond
konna
like.this
tokoro-de
place-Loc
raamen-wa
ramen.noodles-Th
{taberarenai/#meshiagarenai}.
eat.Neg.Pot.Prs/eat.SHon.Neg.Pot.Prs
‘If you were a member of the Imperial Family, you would not be able to eat
ramen at a place like this.’
This contrasts with the case of a Class (i) content, which invariably targets the
augmented common ground.
(40) {There are several people, including Ken, in the room. / #Ken, and nobody
else, is in the room.} If Ken were not in the room, then Lucy would be there
too.
6 ‘There is somebody other than Lucy in the room in actuality.’
 ‘(Even) if Ken were not in the room, there (still) would be somebody other
than Lucy in the room.’
Based on the observations made above, it can be concluded that referent hon-
orifics are Class (v) CI triggers.
8 Conclusion
Projective content (conventional implicature, “not-at-issue” meaning) can usefully be
divided into six classes, based on the opposition of [Context-Checking] vs. [Context-
Updating] and the opposition of [Local-Context Oriented], [Ambioriented], and
[Global-Context Oriented].
(41) i. [Context-Checking]/[Local-Context Oriented]
“classical” presuppositions; e.g., also (additive implication)
ii. [Context-Updating]/[Local-Context Oriented]
“informative” presuppositions; e.g., only (prejacent implication)
3 It is interesting to ask how the CI’s induced by motion-deictic verbs and empathy-loaded verbs
occurring within the consequent of a conditional may project and be filtered. This issue is left for
future research.
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iii. [Context-Checking]/[Ambioriented]
e.g., manage (“difficulty” implicaton), deictic motion verbs, empathy-
loaded verbs
iv. [Context-Updating]/[Ambioriented]
e.g., appositives, NRRCs, expressives
v. [Context-Checking]/[Global-Context Oriented]
e.g., demonstratives (“indication” implication), referent honorific verbs
vi. [Context-Updating]/[Global-Context Oriented]
(unknown)
It is interesting to ask whether further instances can be added to each of Classes
(i)–(v), and whether any can be found that belongs to Class (vi). Gender specification
of pronouns (e.g., Yanovich 2012), for example, will be a controversial case.
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